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Abstract 
 
This project investigates the performance of commodities as an asset class from 
September 24, 2003 to June 30, 2011, in the context of its inclusion within a broader portfolio of 
equities and bonds. Specifically, we examined whether the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index 
(GSCI), a fully-collateralized index of commodity futures, performed better or worse than the 
equity and bond marketplaces leading up to, during, and following the financial crisis of the late-
2000s, and whether or not it provided any diversification benefits to a traditional portfolio. 
Our findings were that the GSCI outperformed U.S. bonds but generally not U.S. stocks 
during the study period, that it was more volatile than both traditional asset classes, offered 
modest diversification benefits, especially after the crisis began, and that it fared worse than 
equities in a review of higher moments. Canadian equity investors would have found the GSCI 
more appealing in a portfolio context than U.S. equity investors would have during the study 
period, due to a more favourable return weak performance of the U.S. Dollar. 
These results are in marked contrast to studies of commodity futures prior to the financial 
crisis, and provide a cautionary note for investors with respect to incorporating a basket of 
commodities that is heavily weighted in a particular commodity type, such as the GSCI, into 
their traditional portfolios. Nevertheless commodities clearly have maintained certain 
diversification benefits, especially during the worst of crisis where they have tended to 
outperform equities. 
On the other hand, an extension of the study period to include the Dotcom crisis revealed 
that commodities offered substantial diversification benefits to a traditional portfolio during that 
iv 
time. In addition, adding commodity futures to a portfolio of stocks and bonds significantly 
reduces downside risk, as measured by Value-at-Risk (VaR). 
On balance, we recommend that a basket of commodity futures be considered for 
inclusion into a traditional portfolio with a long-term investment horizon. 
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Introduction 
Investors are generally familiar with traditional asset classes such as equities, bonds and 
real estate. Commodities, however, are less widely understood. The question as to whether 
commodities can even be considered a separate asset class is an intriguing one. A primary 
argument against the idea of commodities as an asset class is that the constituents within the 
commodities category are not necessarily economically related (Dennis Gartman 2010). For 
example, the factors that drive the price of natural gas, cocoa, and lean hogs are appreciably 
different from one another. On the other hand, it can be argued that the price dynamics of 
commodities share a commonality in that they are principally determined by global supply and 
demand forces. Furthermore, commodity price dynamics often differ with those that apply to the 
equity asset class, where prices are mainly driven by business fundamentals and future expected 
cashflows. In the case of bonds, a movement in interest rates affects all bond prices, regardless of 
type. 
Our thesis will focus on the case for and against commodities as an asset class throughout 
the Late-2000s Financial Crisis (“the Financial Crisis”), based on empirical studies of correlation 
and risk diversification with other traditional asset classes in an asset allocation context. This 
research will also attempt to answer various questions relating to the investment qualities of 
commodities in the framework of portfolio management, and how these assets interact with the 
traditional asset classes of stocks and bonds. Specifically:  
1) How risky are commodity futures relative to other traditional asset classes? 
2) Do commodities continue to exhibit low or negative correlation with stocks and bonds 
during periods of crisis? 
3) Have any new trends emerged? And if so, what is their meaning? 
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Answering these questions and other related concerns could provide a platform for 
increased direct institutional and retail investment into commodities, especially in the case where 
IPS restrictions currently prevent such exposure due to perceived riskiness. It may also provide a 
compelling case for private investors to diversify their own assets into commodities in order to 
protect their portfolio from market and inflation risk.  
 Previous studies have shown that a basket of commodity futures exhibit similar returns 
to U.S. equities, are negatively correlated with equities and bonds, and positively correlated with 
inflation (Erb & Harvey, 2006), (Gorton & Rouwenhorst, 2006). These studies concluded that a 
portfolio of commodity futures was indeed an asset class and that their inclusion into a broader 
portfolio with traditional assets could significantly reduce portfolio risk. On the other hand, these 
studies were completed prior to the Financial Crisis of the Late-2000s
1
. We will investigate 
whether the correlation and diversification effects have changed prior to, during, and after the 
financial crisis. Furthermore, if a change has occurred, we will investigate the possible causes 
and examine whether the benefits of including the commodity asset class into a traditional 
portfolio of assets still apply. 
 
Commodity Futures 
A commodity futures contract is a standardized contract between a buyer and seller that 
stimulates the exchange of a specified commodity at a set price and quantity. The price is agreed 
upon as at the date of inception but not paid until the settlement date. As such, the price that is 
initially set will include an expectation of future spot prices. The future spot price is never 
known with certainty and as such, the investor who purchased the future risks gains or losses 
                                                          
1
 Erb and Harvey (2006) examine historical returns up to and including May, 2004, and Gary and Rouwenhorst 
study data from July, 1959 to December, 2004 inclusive. 
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from unexpected movement in the spot price. As the futures contract reaches expiration, its price 
will converge to the spot price at maturity. Thus, an investor who has purchased a futures 
contract will profit if the spot price at maturity is greater than the futures price. As described by 
Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006), Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) hypothesized the theory of 
normal backwardation, where a risk premium accrues, on average, to the buyers of future 
contracts in order to compensate them for this market risk.  
For the purpose of analyzing commodities as an asset class, we will use commodity 
futures as opposed to spot prices. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) showed that the historical 
inflation-adjusted performance of an index of commodity futures significantly exceeded that of 
spot commodity prices, despite strong, positive correlation. The authors explain that this 
difference is due to the risk premium: that commodity futures, unlike spot prices, rise with any 
risk-premium earned. Commodities also exhibit seasonality patterns that affect spot prices. 
However, as seasonality is foreseeable, an index of futures is unaffected. In addition, investing in 
commodity futures requires collateral, invested in treasury bills, which contributes a risk-free 
rate of return to the total return of the futures. Lastly, investment in commodities is generally in 
the form of futures contracts. Taking the above factors into account, analyzing commodity 
futures as an asset class as opposed to spot prices is to more truly reflective of the nature of 
commodities investing, and it provides a more provide a more meaningful comparison between 
commodities and traditional asset classes that earn a risk-premium. 
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Literature Review 
Robert J. Greer – “What is an Asset Class, Anyway?” 
In order to properly classify commodities as an asset class, we began with a review of 
what an asset class actually is. According to Greer (1997), “an asset class is a set of assets that 
bear some fundamental economic similarities to each other, and that have characteristics that 
make them distinct from other assets that are not part of the class”. Consequently, it is easy to see 
the argument for commodities not being an asset class as the fundamental drivers that affect one 
commodity can be quite different from that of another. 
Greer defines three broad classes of assets: capital assets, consumable/transformable 
assets, and store of value assets. Capital assets provide an ongoing source of value and include 
such assets as equities, bonds, and real estate. Equities offer the expectation of dividends, bonds 
give the expectation of interest payments and principal, and real estate offers an ongoing stream 
of operating income in addition to residual value. Moreover, each class has characteristics that 
distinguish it economically from each other. For instance, equities return the residual value of the 
asset while bonds have a prior claim to equity in a fixed amount. 
The second broad category of assets is consumable and transformable assets. These assets 
can be transformed into another form, consumed, but does not yield an ongoing stream of value. 
Included in this category are physical commodities. Compared to capital assets, consumable and 
transformable assets are cannot be valued using net-present-value analysis. Global supply and 
demand are the main determinants of price for consumable and transformable assets. Another 
economically distinguishing characteristic is that consumable and transformable assets cannot be 
explained by the CAPM. Black (1976) mentions that commodity futures are not included in the 
market portfolio. As such, it is only logical that the model cannot explain this category of non-
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capital assets. In this context, it is clear that commodity futures should be considered as an asset 
class. 
The last broad category described by Greer is store of value assets. These assets cannot 
be consumed and does not generate income. Examples are fine art and currency. Investors will 
hold one currency over another if they feel that it will appreciate and represent a better store of 
value. Likewise, investors may hold currency or cash if they are uncertain about other asset 
classes. 
 
Gary Gorton & K. Geert Rouwenhorst – “Facts and Fantasies about Commodity Futures” 
Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) also studied the simple properties of commodity futures 
as an asset class. They sought to answer commonly raised questions about investment properties 
of commodity futures as an asset class by analyzing a long-term, monthly time series of an 
equally-weighted index of futures. Noting that futures positions are typically levered due to 
posted collateral being only a fraction of the notional value of the contract, they controlled for 
leverage by assuming full collateralization of the index, prior to calculating returns. This allowed 
them to offer a more meaningful comparison between the performance of commodity futures and 
the performance of traditional asset classes. 
As a first task, the authors compared the real returns of the fully-collateralized futures 
asset class to the real returns of an equally-weighted portfolio of commodity spot prices from 
1959 to 2004. They concluded that the fund of collateralized futures dramatically outperformed 
the spot commodities, and that both indices outpaced CPI. They also noted the high positive 
correlation and strong divergence of commodity futures and spot values. Since commodity 
futures rise with the risk-free rate plus any risk premium earned, and returns do not include 
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expected future movements in the spot price, the accompanying returns are subject to a different 
trend than spot returns are. They further recognize that by using equally-weighted indices, they 
are applying an embedded trading strategy which would outperform a buy-and-hold strategy if 
returns aren’t independently distributed over time (as shown by Blume and Stambaugh (1983) 
and Roll (1983)). Their research demonstrated that a buy-and-hold strategy for spot commodities 
radically lowers the spot index returns versus a strategy of frequent rebalancing, and that spot 
commodity returns did not keep pace with CPI, over the 45-year study period. 
The authors also found that commodity futures had a similar cumulative real return to the 
S&P 500, albeit with long interim periods (1970s and 1990s) of wildly dissimilar performance, 
and that both asset classes outperformed bonds by a wide margin. Furthermore, the calculated 
risk premium was similar for stocks and commodities and was more than double that of bonds. 
Intriguingly, collateralized commodity futures had positive skewness and a large excess kurtosis, 
implying that the return distribution of such futures deviate from the normal distribution in that it 
has fatter tails, with especially more weight on the right tail. Stocks also had positive excess 
kurtosis, but had negative skewness and thus more weight on the left tail. Thus, stocks appear to 
have more downside risk than commodity futures. In addition, stocks were shown to have had a 
higher volatility than commodity futures. 
A look at correlations between the traditional asset classes and commodity futures 
revealed that, over quarterly, annual and 5-year holding periods, collateralized commodity future 
returns were negatively correlated with those of stocks and bonds, with a small (near-zero) 
positive correlation for monthly holding periods. The hypothesis that correlations of futures with 
stocks and bonds is zero could not be rejected, however the results indicated that commodity 
futures are effective in diversifying portfolios composed of traditional asset classes, with 
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increasing effectiveness over longer holding periods. Gorton and Rouwenhorst also discovered 
that commodity futures have a positive correlation with inflation (CPI), and that the correlation 
increased over longer holding periods. This suggests that over the long-term, commodities have 
inflationary properties. 
Commodity futures also offer diversification benefits due to their return behaviour 
throughout the business cycle. Whereas stocks and bonds outperform commodity futures in the 
late stages of recession and early stages of expansion, the reverse is true during the late stages of 
expansion and early stages of recession. Furthermore, whenever stock and bond returns are 
below their average for a business cycle, it is precisely the time that commodity future returns 
are positive and outperform the traditional asset classes. 
Noting that in an efficient market, a profitable trading strategy of selecting commodity 
futures according to the size of their basis (difference between futures price and current spot 
price) must be due to variation of required risk premiums or changing risk over time, the authors 
established such a trading strategy. They found that a strategy of rebalancing monthly a portfolio 
towards a low basis outperformed the equally weighted index by about the same amount that the 
strategy of rebalancing a portfolio towards a high basis underperformed. Furthermore, the low 
basis strategy outperformed the high basis strategy by 10% per annum on average. They 
concluded that “the futures basis seems to hold important information about the risk premium of 
individual commodities”. 
Finally, Gorton and Rouwenhorst studied both the real return history of commodity 
futures from the perspective of foreign investors, and investigated whether an investment in 
companies that produce commodities is a substitute for an investment in commodity futures. 
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They discovered that UK and Japanese investors in commodity futures would have fared 
similarly over time to U.S. investors, and that commodity equities are not an appropriate 
substitute for collateralized futures of the same commodity. They also discovered that 
commodity equities had a stronger positive correlation with the S&P 500 than they did with the 
commodity futures. 
Through their study, Gorton and Rouwenhorst demonstrated that an equally weighted 
index of commodity futures would have greatly outperformed spot commodities from July, 1959 
to December, 2004. They also showed that a long position in such an index had a positive risk 
premium that exceeded that of bonds and matched that of equities, that the historical risk of an 
investment in commodity futures had been relatively low in terms of variation and downside 
risk, and that commodity futures provided substantial diversification benefits to a portfolio of 
stocks and bonds due to its negative correlation to the traditional asset classes over the long-term. 
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Data and Methodology 
The Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) 
In order to measure the performance of commodities, we used the S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index as a proxy. This index is unlevered and takes long-only positions in commodity 
futures contracts. Although leveraged commodity indices exist, we assume that an unlevered 
index would be more representative of a typical commodities investment style by an average 
investor or by institutional investors constrained by IPS restrictions on leverage. It is fully 
collateralized meaning that for every $1 invested in a futures contract, there is $1 invested in T-
bills. This is consistent with the actual dynamics of futures contract trading as some collateral is 
always posted with the exchange when an investor takes a position; the difference in this case is 
that leverage is removed by matching full collateral against the notional value, instead of just a 
fraction thereof. Each month, the collateralized commodity futures investment is rolled forward 
to the next month.  
The GSCI is composed of 24 commodities that are included based on liquidity and 
weighted according to their corresponding world production quantities. The index includes six 
energy products, five industrial metals, eight agricultural products, three livestock products, and 
two precious metals. This process therefore reflects the liquidity of the market and the futures 
contracts that would be available to an investor. In contrast to an equal-weighted index, a 
production-weighted index avoids issues relating to a lack of futures contracts for thinly traded 
commodities. 
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Table 1 – S&P GSCI Index Components (as of 12/31/2010) 
Energy 
 
 
Industrial Metals 
 
 
Agriculture 
 
Crude Oil 34.6% 
 
Aluminum 2.4% 
 
Wheat 3.8% 
Brent Crude 14.3% 
 
Copper 4.0% 
 
Kansas Wheat 0.8% 
Unleaded 
Gasoline 
4.3% 
 
Lead 0.5% 
 
Corn 4.3% 
Heating Oil 4.5% 
 
Nickel 0.8% 
 
Soybeans 2.7% 
Gas Oil 5.5% 
 
Zinc 0.6% 
 
Cotton 1.8% 
Natural Gas 3.2% 
 
 
8.3% 
 
Sugar 2.8% 
 
66.5% 
    
Coffee 1.0% 
   
Livestock 
 
 
Cocoa 0.3% 
Precious Metals 
 
 
Feeder Cattle 0.4% 
 
 
17.4% 
Gold 2.9% 
 
Live Cattle 2.5% 
   Silver 0.5% 
 
Lean Hogs 1.4% 
   
 
3.4% 
 
 
4.3% 
    
Data 
To compare the performance of the GSCI, the S&P 500 was used as a proxy for equities 
and the iShares Barclays Aggregate Bond Fund was used as a proxy for bonds. In addition, the 
National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries Index (NCREIF Index) was used as a 
proxy for real estate. As this index is reported only quarterly, the GSCI was compared based on a 
quarterly interval as well. Our analysis included a look at inflation and whether the positive 
correlation with commodities still existed after the financial crisis. 
The time period chosen for our analysis was September 24, 2003 to June 30, 2011. 
Notably, there is a data limitation for the Barclays Aggregate Bond Fund prior to this date. 
Nevertheless, this period includes the effects of the 2007-2009 financial crisis with roughly the 
same length of time before and after the event. For the analysis, this period was separated into 
three sub-intervals: a pre-crisis period (09/24/2003 to 06/29/2007), a crisis period (06/29/2007 to 
03/31/2009), and a post-crisis period (03/31/2009 to 06/30/2011). These intervals were chosen so 
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that we are able to analyze the performance of commodities before, during, and after the 
financial crisis. 
For the NCREIF Index and CPI, the period chosen for analysis was June 30, 2003 to June 
30, 2011. Similar to the analysis with respect to equities and bonds, this period was split into 
three sub-intervals: a pre-crisis period (06/30/2003 to 06/30/2007), a crisis period (06/30/2007 to 
03/31/2009), and a post-crisis period (03/31/2009 to 06/30/2011). As reporting for the NCREIF 
and CPI was less frequent, we looked at a slightly longer period than that used for the S&P 500 
and Barclays Aggregate Bond Fund. 
 
Analysis 
Comparison with Equities and Bonds 
For the full and sub-periods, returns and volatility for the GSCI Index, S&P 500 Index, 
and Barclays Aggregate Bond Fund were calculated: 
Table 2 – Full Period, 09/24/2003 – 06/30/2011 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P 500 Index 
Barclays Aggregate 
Bond Index 
Annualized Return 3.24% 3.52% 0.59% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 26.98% 21.10% 5.97% 
Sharpe Ratio -0.03 -0.02 -0.57 
t-Statistic 5.31 7.38 4.39 
 
A look at the full period from 09/24/2003 to 06/30/2011 indicates that the return of the 
GSCI was roughly similar to that of the S&P 500 but with a higher amount of volatility. Both of 
these indices outperformed the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index. However, all asset classes 
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underperformed the risk-free rate of 3.97%, as measured as the average 10 year U.S. 
Government treasury yield for that period. 
Table 3 – Pre-Crisis Period, 09/24/2003 – 06/29/2007 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P 500 Index 
Barclays Aggregate 
Bond Index 
Annualized Return 11.64% 11.16% -0.93% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 23.12% 10.67% 3.89% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.31 0.63 -1.39 
t-Statistic 15.51 32.20 -7.38 
 
During the pre-crisis period, the volatility of the S&P 500 was less than half of the 
volatility of the GSCI. With much higher volatility and incrementally higher return, the idea of 
holding commodities within a broader portfolio ostensibly loses appeal. However, before ruling 
out the feasibility of commodities as an asset class, we must examine the correlations which 
could reveal potential diversification benefits. 
Table 4 – Crisis Period, 06/29/2007 – 03/31/2009 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P 500 Index 
Barclays Aggregate 
Bond Index 
Annualized Return -25.62% -30.31% 1.79% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 36.62% 36.20% 10.02% 
Sharpe Ratio -0.80 -0.94 -0.20 
t-Statistic -14.71 -17.61 3.76 
 
Interestingly, during the crisis period, the volatility of the GSCI was almost identical to 
that of the S&P 500. However, the S&P 500’s return was lower than that of the GSCI. Both the 
S&P 500 and GSCI underperformed the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index which returned 1.79%. 
During this period, the volatility of the Barclays Index increased substantially as well, 
demonstrating the ferocity of the crisis and its impact on all asset classes. 
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Table 5 – Post-Crisis Period, 03/31/2009 – 06/30/2011 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P 500 Index 
Barclays Aggregate 
Bond Index 
Annualized Return 16.88% 25.00% 2.24% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 23.95% 17.92% 4.41% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.57 1.21 -0.24 
t-Statistic 16.81 33.28 12.11 
 
Finally, in the post-crisis period, we see that the GSCI, the S&P 500, and the Barclays 
Aggregate Index all garnered higher returns relative to the full and sub-periods. The volatility of 
the GSCI and Barclays indices returned to pre-crisis levels. In the case of equities, volatility also 
decreased, but was still significantly higher than the levels seen prior to the crisis. This could be 
due to the ongoing fragility of the world economy generally, and the U.S. economy specifically. 
In particular, U.S. unemployment has risen dramatically post-crisis and the U.S. housing market 
has yet to gain traction, likely contributing to a continued lack of overall demand. Against a 
backdrop of trillions of dollars of global wealth having vanished during the financial crisis, and a 
widespread sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the U.S. stock market has found itself under 
continued downward pressure. 
More to the point, a look at the Volatility S&P 500 Index (VIX) in the chart below 
reveals that our post-crisis study period begins at a time where Implied Volatility of the S&P 500 
was still extremely high, though decreasing rapidly, as the stock market finally rose from its 
crisis-induced low. Then, thirteen months later, in April, 2010, Greece bonds were downgraded 
to junk status, Portuguese and Spanish credit was also downgraded, and the stock market reacted 
with high volatility once again. Thus, the early stages of the post-crisis period and the later 
aftershock of the European credit downgrades contributed to massive volatility for stocks and 
have kept S&P returns from reverting to their pre-crisis, relative stability. 
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Figure 1 – Relative Performance of the GSCI Total Return, S&P 500 & VIX Indices 
 
We also calculated the correlations between the GSCI and VIX, and the S&P 500 and VIX. 
Table 6 – VIX Index Correlation with S&P GSCI Total Return and S&P 500 Indices 
 GSCI S&P 500 Index 
Pre-crisis 
09/24/2003 – 06/29/2007 
-0.0212 -0.7864 
Crisis 
06/29/2007 – 03/31/2009 
-0.2431 -0.7991 
Post-Crisis 
03/31/2009 – 06/30/2011 
-0.4134 -0.7363 
Full Period 
09/24/2003 – 06/30/2011 
-0.2056 -0.7364 
 
Prior to the crisis, swings in volatility as measured by the VIX index were uncorrelated 
with the returns of the GSCI and bore a strong negative correlation with the S&P. Once the crisis 
began, however, high volatility became increasingly correlated with negative returns for not only 
the S&P 500, but for the GSCI as well. Thus, from the crisis onwards, the GSCI has provided 
less function as a risk-diversifying investment. 
 
  
0
100
200
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400
09/2003 09/2005 09/2007 09/2009
Sep 24 2003 = 100 
S&P GSCI Total Return S&P 500 VIX
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Figure 2– Relative Performance of the GSCI Total Return Index and Barclays Aggregate Bond Index 
 
Correlations 
Given that the returns of the S&P GSCI Total Return Index are comparable to those of 
the S&P 500 but with greater volatility, it begs the question as to why anyone would want to 
invest in commodities. To begin to answer this query, we examine the correlation and 
diversification effects of adding the GSCI Commodity Index to a portfolio of traditional assets. 
 
Table 7 – S&P GSCI Total Return Index Correlation with Stocks and Bonds 
 S&P 500 Index 
Barclays Aggregate 
Bond Index 
Stocks and Bonds 
Correlation 
Pre-crisis 
09/24/2003 – 06/29/2007 
-0.0185 0.0469 -0.0704 
Crisis 
06/29/2007 – 03/31/2009 
0.3216 0.0982 -0.0474 
Post-Crisis 
03/31/2009 – 06/30/2011 
0.5835 -0.2316 -0.3071 
Full Period 
09/24/2003 – 06/30/2011 
0.2943 0.0179 -0.0989 
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Sep 24 2003 = 100 
S&P GSCI Total Return Barclays Aggregate Bond Index
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Table 8 – S&P GSCI Total Return Index Correlation with Inflation and the NCREIF Index 
 Inflation (CPI) Inflation (Core) 
NCREIF Index 
(Quarterly) 
Pre-crisis 
06/30/2003 – 06/30/2007 
0.2556 -0.1746 -0.3237 
Crisis 
06/30/2007 – 03/31/2009 
0.5647 0.1966 0.6864 
Post-Crisis 
03/31/2009 – 06/30/2011 
0.2786 0.3717 0.0641 
Full Period 
06/30/2003 – 06/30/2011 
0.4285 0.3503 0.3222 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, the small negative correlation between the GSCI and equities 
and the near-zero correlation with bonds meant that the GSCI could help reduce overall portfolio 
volatility. In addition, the positive correlation of 0.2556 with inflation meant that the GSCI Index 
was helping, modestly, to preserve purchasing power. However we see that the GSCI is 
negatively correlated with core inflation, a measure that excludes food and energy, Because real 
estate was increasing steadily while commodities exhibited volatility, the GSCI had a negative 
correlation with the NCREIF Index. 
During the crisis, however, some of these relationships have changed substantially. Most 
notably, the correlation of the GSCI Index with the S&P 500 surged from -0.0185 to 0.3216 
while the correlation with the Barclays Aggregate was still relatively low. The correlation 
between the S&P 500 and Barclays Aggregate also remained relatively constant and negatively 
correlated. Furthermore, the economy contracted while asset prices fell. Thus, the correlation 
with inflation increased during the crisis, and the correlation with real estate went from negative 
to a strong positive correlation.  
 In the post-crisis period, the performance of the GSCI became even more strongly 
correlated with the S&P 500 and more negatively correlated with the Barclays Aggregate. 
Similarly, the correlation between the S&P 500 and Barclays Aggregate became more negatively 
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correlated as well. Taking into account the fact that the GSCI had twice the amount of volatility 
and roughly the same return as the S&P 500 in the post-crisis period, this high correlation 
inevitably dampens the diversification benefits of the GSCI Index. During this time the GSCI 
reverted to its pre-crisis correlation level with CPI but did not return to a negative correlation 
with core inflation, Instead of returning to being negatively correlated with core inflation, the 
GSCI increased its correlation instead. This time, we find a small, positive correlation with the 
NCREIF suggesting that the GSCI was moving independently of real estate. 
 
Rolling Period Volatility and Correlations 
 In an attempt to gain insight into the behaviour of correlation and volatility, we calculated 
21 day rolling standard deviations and correlations between the GSCI and the S&P 500 for the 
full period. This frequency was selected based on there being 252 trading days and 12 months in 
a year (252 divided by 12 yields 21). However, there were no conclusions that could be drawn 
with respect to the relationship between the rolling correlation and standard deviations. 
Nevertheless, it is a striking image of how the average correlation between stocks and 
commodities has increased dramatically from prior to the crisis to present day. 
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Figure 3 – 21 Day Rolling Correlations and Volatilities 
 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September, 2008, and then again at the 
very bottom of the S&P 500 market in March, 2009, we see the dramatic increase in correlation 
between the GSCI and S&P 500. To verify this change in correlation levels, we performed a 
Paired Two-Sample t-Test for Equal Means (Snedecor & Cochran, 1989). The trend in 
correlation seems to change most noticeably at September 9, 2008, coinciding with the onset of 
the bankruptcy of Lehmann Brothers
2
, and so we chose that date as the break-point between the 
two samples of equal size. 
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Table 9 – Two-Sample t-Test for Equal Means: Correlation Between GSCI & S&P 500 Pre- and Post-Lehman 
 
Pre-Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy 
11/14/2005 – 9/8/2008 
Post-Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy 
9/9/2008 – 6/30/2011 
Mean correlation 0.0091 0.5297 
Observations 709 709 
Pearson correlation 0.1243  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Degrees of Freedom 708  
t Stat (T) -44.073  
t Critical two-tail (t0.025,708) 1.6470  
 
We see that the mean correlation of the GSCI and S&P 500 in the 709 days prior to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers is close to zero, at 0.0091. Afterwards, the sample mean correlation 
is much higher, at 0.5297. Since T < -t0.025,708 we reject the null hypothesis that the two means of 
the distribution are equal. The test confirms that a material change in correlation between the 
GSCI and S&P 500 occurred at or around the time of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
As mentioned earlier, the GSCI is heavily weighted in energy commodities (66.5% of 
total index) in general and Crude Oil (34.6%) in particular, the prices of which are dictated 
largely by global expected supply and demand. When many trillions of dollars of global wealth 
were wiped out during the depths of the Financial Crisis and global economic outlook worsened 
immediately, the price of oil entered into a steep decline alongside (and surpassing that of) equity 
values. With each bit of positive and negative economic news since that time, it is likely that 
investor expectations of both equity and oil price performance have hinged on the same concept: 
that economic growth expectations drive value above all else. 
20 
 
An additional, related reason for the increased correlation between commodities and 
equities post-crisis could be a higher level of risk aversion among investors. The idea that 
investor behaviour has followed an indiscriminate, “risk-on, risk-off” pattern of buying and 
selling has often appeared in the financial press (where “risk-on” is synonymous with a bull 
market and “risk-off” is synonymous with a bear market). The idea is that, as the Financial Crisis 
worsened and eventually segued into repeated aftershock crises, it is plausible that frequent, 
renewed economic pessimism has led to investors entering and exiting the financial markets en 
masse. The above t-test provides support for this conclusion as correlations increased 
dramatically following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, and have stayed high ever since. A 
companion idea to “risk-on, risk-off” is that of “flight to safety,” where investors in risky assets 
like stocks and commodities flee into “safe” assets like U.S. Treasuries and gold. We can see 
below that the stock market and U.S. 10-year Treasury yields have both stayed at or below pre-
crisis levels, and have even begun to move more often in the same direction. This suggests that 
as value has been removed from the equity market, demand for relatively safe U.S. bonds has 
increased, leading to high prices and low yields. In the same fashion, demand for gold, long-
considered a “safe” asset during turbulent economic periods, has also led to a rise in prices. 
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Figure 4– Relative Performance of the S&P 500, Gold Spot Price and 10-Year U.S. Treasuries 
 
ETFs and High Frequency Trading 
 We believe that this increase in correlation is due to indexation, ETFs, and high 
frequency trading that grew in popularity in the late-2000s. As discussed by Sakoui and 
Kaminska (2010), when so-called indexed ETFs are purchased or sold, the underlying 
constituents get bought and sold as well. As such, during times of market distress, investors may 
sell their indexed ETFs regardless of the asset classes tracked by that ETF. Thus, even if 
commodities futures were not directly impacted by market distress, the sale of commodity-linked 
ETFs would cause the underlying constituents (commodities futures in this case) to be liquidated 
and prices to decrease. High frequency trading, which allows investors to buy and sale securities 
in mere seconds helps facilitate the effects mentioned above. 
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Higher Moments 
In order to gain a further insight into the distribution of returns, we looked at the 
skewness and kurtosis of the three asset classes: 
Table 10 – Comparison of Skewness 
 
S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P 500 Index 
Barclays Aggregate 
Bond Index 
Pre-crisis 
09/24/2003 – 06/29/2007 
0.1581 -0.1735 -0.0787 
Crisis 
06/29/2007 – 03/31/2009 
-0.1476 0.1845 -2.2530 
Post-Crisis 
03/31/2009 – 06/30/2011 
-0.2104 -0.1910 -0.4890 
 
Table 11 – Comparison of Kurtosis 
 
S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P 500 Index 
Barclays Aggregate 
Bond Index 
Pre-crisis 
09/24/2003 – 06/29/2007 
3.3962 3.9658 3.6931 
Crisis 
06/29/2007 – 03/31/2009 
4.3725 7.2861 37.7039 
Post-Crisis 
03/31/2009 – 06/30/2011 
4.0313 4.5479 5.1299 
 
In general, positive skewness is desirable in financial assets it describes an asymmetry 
with greater weight in the right tail; this translates into more frequent, higher realizable returns 
than would otherwise be seen in a symmetrical return distribution. While the Barclays Aggregate 
Bond Index maintained its negative skewness in all periods, the GSCI and S&P 500 reversed 
their skewness during the financial crisis. In other words, during the financial crisis, the GSCI 
Index had disproportionate, negative returns compared with the period prior, whereas the S&P 
500 encountered larger positive returns than before. Thus, during times of distress to its 
component assets, the GSCI is more likely than the S&P 500 to experience outlying negative 
returns that are generally not encountered in normal periods. This is a finding that reduces the 
creditability of commodities as a diversifying asset class. Consistent with previous results, it 
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appears that the dynamics of commodities as an asset class may have changed subsequent to the 
financial crisis. 
Kurtosis is a measure of “peakedness” and a higher value represents that the distribution 
is likely to have more extreme values (both negative and positive) than a normal distribution. In 
general, a lower kurtosis is desired as it translates into a lower likelihood of extreme outcomes. It 
is expected that the shock of the financial crisis would cause all asset classes to realize a higher 
kurtosis. The kurtosis of the S&P 500 increased more substantially than that of the GSCI Index 
while the Barclays Aggregate jumped the most. This is consistent with the previous analysis of 
standard deviation where the volatility of the S&P 500 more than doubled whereas the GSCI’s 
increased by roughly 30%. 
Following the crisis, the S&P 500 and the GSCI Index both exhibit similar levels of 
negative skewness and positive kurtosis. Prior to the crisis, the GSCI Index displayed a 
favourably positive skewness but it appears this advantage has now disappeared. The 
combination of the S&P 500’s comparable return at a lower risk and higher kurtosis signal that 
the equities asset class is making a more consistent recovery than the GSCI Index. From a 
diversification perspective, inclusion of a commodities index can still provide lowered volatility 
but at much less pronounced of an effect than prior to the financial crisis. 
 
Mean Variance Efficient Frontiers 
To gain further insight into the portfolio diversification effects of commodities, we 
looked at the mean-variance efficient frontier with only stocks (represented by the S&P 500) and 
bonds (represented by the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index) and then again with the S&P GSCI 
24 
 
Total Return Index included. Once again, the analysis was conducted based on the full period 
and also the sub-periods. 
Figure 4 – Full Period Mean-Variance Efficient Frontier 
 
Taking the full period into perspective, the three asset frontier is higher than the two asset 
frontier at all points. At every level of risk, inclusion of the GSCI Index can increase expected 
returns. Put another way, the addition of the GSCI Index can help generate the same expected 
return with less risk. This is consistent with the findings of Jensen et al. (2002), who showed that 
commodity futures provided a higher rate of return when added to a traditional portfolio. 
Figure 5 – Pre-Crisis Mean-Variance Efficient Frontier 
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As shown in Figure 5, in the pre-crisis period, the inclusion of the GSCI Index shifts the 
efficient frontier to the left representing a decrease in risk for certain levels of returns. The 
addition of the GSCI also allows for a higher expected return overall but this increment comes 
with a greater amount of risk as well. Because the GSIC had a slightly higher return than the 
S&P 500, there are additional points available on the frontiers that are not obtainable with just 
the two assets of stocks and bonds. However, this marginally higher point of expected return 
comes with substantially higher risk and as such may not be a feasible choice for most investors. 
Figure 6– Crisis-Period Mean-Variance Efficient Frontier 
 
During the crisis, the efficient frontier with two assets is nearly identical to that of the 
three asset frontier except at certain lower risk points. Taking into account the scale of the axis, 
these points represent an insignificantly minor range. Thus, during the crisis, we can say that the 
inclusion of the GSCI Index into a portfolio of equities and bonds no longer yields the same 
magnitude of diversification benefits as before. 
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Figure 7 – Post-Crisis Mean-Variance Efficient Frontier 
 
Finally, subsequent to the financial crisis, it is apparent that the efficient frontier with 
three assets is entirely identical to that with two assets. Even the previously more efficient points 
between the 0.095 and 0.096 standard deviation intervals (as shown in Figure 6 – Crisis-Period 
Mean-Variance Efficient Frontier) have disappeared. As such, despite the less than one 
correlation with the S&P 500, the lower expected return and higher standard deviation of the 
GSCI Index has made it an obsolete asset class in terms of portfolio allocation. 
 
Commodity Index Decomposition 
The GSCI index is heavily weighted according to energy commodities, holding 66.5% in 
various oil and gasoline products as at December 31, 2010. Thus, GSCI returns are 
disproportionately correlated with the returns of energy commodities. Crude oil, for instance, 
accounts for nearly half of the entire index, so it is no surprise to discover that the correlation 
between the index itself and the All Crude Oil sub-index is 96.3% for the study period. 
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S&P GSCI Index vs. S&P TSX Composite 
 With the performance of the GSCI throughout the Financial Crisis so heavily influenced 
by energy commodities, we extended our analysis to the Canadian equity market, which is very 
heavily weighted by energy stocks. We thus compared the S&P GSCI Total Return Index 
(adjusted for currency) to the S&P TSX Composite. 
Table 12 – Full Period, Comparison with the S&P TSX Composite 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index (Adj.) 
S&P 500 Index 
S&P TSX 
Composite 
Annualized Return 8.25% 3.52% 7.39% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 33.32% 21.10% 19.84% 
 
Table 13 – Pre-Crisis Period, Comparison with the S&P TSX Composite 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index (Adj.) 
S&P 500 Index 
S&P TSX 
Composite 
Annualized Return 19.86% 11.16% 17.22% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 26.37% 10.67% 11.49% 
 
Table 14 – Crisis Period, Comparison with the S&P TSX Composite 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index (Adj.) 
S&P 500 Index 
S&P TSX 
Composite 
Annualized Return -32.41% -30.31% -23.36% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 45.43% 36.20% 33.39% 
 
Table 15 – Post-Crisis Period, Comparison with the S&P TSX Composite 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index (Adj.) 
S&P 500 Index 
S&P TSX 
Composite 
Annualized Return 31.64% 25.00% 20.56% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 32.50% 17.92% 16.40% 
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The S&P TSX Composite adjusted for currency generally underperformed the GSCI and 
S&P 500, with the exception of during the crisis period. This was due to the fact that the CAD 
was strengthening against the USD during the crisis. As such, the returns of the GSCI were 
amplified by the currency effects. 
Figure 8 – USD/CAD Exchange Rate 
 
Table 16 – S&P GSCI Total Return Index Correlation with S&P 500 and TSX 
 S&P 500 Index 
S&P TSX 
Composite 
Pre-crisis 
09/24/2003 – 06/29/2007 
-0.0185 0.3922 
Crisis 
06/29/2007 – 03/31/2009 
0.3216 0.5589 
Post-Crisis 
03/31/2009 – 06/30/2011 
0.5835 0.6857 
Full Period 
09/24/2003 – 06/30/2011 
0.2943 0.5350 
 
As shown in Table 14, the GSCI Index is far more positively correlated with the S&P 
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towards energy and materials (these sectors comprise approximately half of the TSX), however 
the magnitude of this positive correlation was eye-catching. 
Figure 9 – Full Period MV Efficient Frontier with TSX 
 
The addition of the GSCI, adjusted for currency into a two-asset context significantly 
improves the mean variance efficient frontier for a Canadian investor. This is not surprising 
given that the return of the GSCI (Adj) outperformed that of the TSX Index. Risk-tolerant 
investors stand to gain the most benefits due to the relateively high volatility of the GSCI (Adj), 
which accompanies its high return. 
Figure 10 – Pre-Crisis Period MV Efficient Frontier with TSX 
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Figure 11 – Crisis Period MV Efficient Frontier with TSX 
 
Figure 12 – Post-Crisis Period MV Efficient Frontier with TSX 
 
The diversification benefits of the GSCI Index with the TSX are more pronounced than 
they were with the S&P 500, and conservative investors would have especially had reason to 
hold the GSCI during the crisis due to the better correlations. In the pre- and post-crisis periods, 
the superior return of the GSCI (Adj) to the TSX results in an improved frontier, especially for 
the more risk-tolerant individuals. This is attributable to the higher return and lower volatility of 
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allocation context during the study period than it was in the U.S. portfolio asset allocation 
context. 
 
Extension of the Study Period 
Inclusion of the Dotcom Crisis 
In order to confirm that the results observed from the “financial crisis” periods were not a one-
time phenomenon, we extended our analysis backwards to another familiar event, the “Dotcom Crash”. In 
this scenario, we looked at the period from January 31, 1997 to June 29, 2007 (which excludes the 
financial crisis period). It should be noted that this scenario also includes the effects of the 2002 stock 
market downturn that was initiated by September 11 in addition to the crash of technology stocks after the 
Dotcom bubble burst in March 2000. The sub-intervals were as follows: a pre-Dotcom crisis period 
(01/31/1997 to 03/31/2000), a Dotcom crisis period (03/31/2000 to 01/31/2003), and a post-Dotcom crisis 
period (01/31/2003 to 06/29/2007). 
Figure 13 – Performance of the GSCI Total Return Index, GSCI Equal-Weighted Index, and S&P 500 
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Table 17 – Pre-Dotcom Crisis Period, 01/31/1997 – 03/31/2000 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P GSCI Equal-
Weighted Index 
S&P 500 Index JPM Bond Index 
Annualized Return -3.64% -3.76% 22.56% 6.04% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 16.93% 11.39% 19.47% 4.10% 
Sharpe Ratio -0.56 -0.84 0.86 0.07 
t-Statistic -6.07 -9.34 32.76 41.65 
 
In the period leading up to the Dotcom crash and subsequent market downturn, we find that the 
GSCI Indices (both the production-weighted and equal-weighted) have significantly underperformed the 
S&P 500 and the JP Morgan Bond Index. This is primarily due to the “Great Commodities Depression” 
where commodities had been in a bear market for over two decades during the 1980’s and 1990’s. The 
S&P 500 on the other hand, was immune to this trend and posted an annual return of 22.6% during this 
period. 
Table 18 – Dotcom Crisis Period, 03/31/2000 – 01/31/2003 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P GSCI Equal-
Weighted Index 
S&P 500 Index JPM Bond Index 
Annualized Return 9.83% 2.59% -18.01% 10.15% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 22.47% 12.61% 23.27% 4.03% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.22 -0.19 -0.99 1.28 
t-Statistic 11.67 5.48 -20.64 67.14 
 
We begin to see some interesting results during the Dotcom crisis period where the returns of the 
GSCI Indices significantly outperformed the S&P 500 with similar or less levels of risk. It should be 
noted that the commodities bear market that was present during the pre-Dotcom period ended in the late-
1990s. However, equity and commodity asset classes alike both underperformed the JPM Bond Index 
which also demonstrated minimal volatility. During this period, the GSCI production-weighted index 
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returned 9.8% compared to the equal-weighted index which returned 2.6%. This was due to further 
decline in agriculture and metals prices, while energy prices increased substantially. 
Table 19 – Post-Dotcom Crisis Period, 01/31/2003 – 06/29/2007 
 S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P GSCI Equal-
Weighted Index 
S&P 500 Index JPM Bond Index 
Annualized Return 9.24% 15.57% 13.64% 3.72% 
Annualized Standard Deviation 23.23% 15.42% 11.97% 3.57% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.21 0.73 0.77 -0.19 
t-Statistic 13.26 33.67 37.97 34.80 
 
In the post-Dotcom crisis period, the equal-weighted GSCI Index has now overtaken its 
production-weighted counterpart. Both GSCI Indices and the S&P 500 outperformed the JPM Bond Index 
with greater Sharpe ratios. Once again, we find that the decision on how a commodities index is weighted 
has a substantial impact on its performance. During this period, the production-weighted GSCI Index was 
heavily weighted in energy, a sub-index that, despite almost doubling in prices over the period, 
underperformed relative to metals. Metals tripled in value over the same time period, and agricultural 
commodities also increased in value, giving the equally-weighted GSCI a better return.  
 
Correlations – Dotcom Crisis 
Table 20 – Pre-Dotcom crisis, 01/31/1997 – 03/31/2000 
Correlation GSCI-TR GSCI-EQ Equities Bond 
GSCI-TR 1.0000 - - - 
GSCI-EQ 0.8657 1.0000 - - 
Equity -0.0255 0.0264 1.0000 - 
Bonds -0.0652 -0.0892 0.0453 1.0000 
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Table 21 – Dotcom Crisis, 03/31/2000 – 01/31/2003 
Correlation GSCI-TR GSCI-EQ Equities Bonds 
GSCI-TR 1.0000 - - - 
GSCI-EQ 0.8639 1.0000 - - 
Equities 0.0363 0.0822 1.0000 - 
Bonds -0.1123 -0.1177 -0.3210 1.0000 
 
Table 22 – Post-Dotcom Crisis, 01/31/2003 – 06/29/2007 
Correlation GSCI-TR GSCI-EQ Equities Bonds 
GSCI-TR 1.0000 - - - 
GSCI-EQ 0.8338 1.0000 - - 
Equities -0.0910 0.0111 1.0000 - 
Bonds 0.0789 0.0507 -0.0620 1.0000 
 
 
Interestingly enough, we find that the correlations during the Dotcom crisis are much more 
resilient than that during the financial crisis. Specifically, both GSCI Indices retained their high 
correlation (over 0.80) throughout the full period. Furthermore, the GSCI Indices also exhibited a 
negative to near-zero correlation with the S&P 500 before, during, and after the Dotcom crisis. This 
finding is contrary to what was observed during the Financial Crisis periods. We believe that this 
difference can be explained by the growing popularity of indexation and high frequency trading that 
became more prominent in the late-2000s (Kaminska and Sakoui 2010) . The result of which, was a rise 
in correlation across asset classes. As such, if we viewed only this event in isolation, it would appear that 
commodities as an asset class did in fact add significant diversification benefits and improved risk-reward 
in relation to other traditional asset classes. 
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Higher Moments – Dotcom Crisis 
As discussed previously, returns of assets are rarely normally distributed. In reality, we find that 
skewness and kurtosis exist. A positive skewness is preferred as is signifies that there is more weight in 
the right tail of the distribution. A lower kurtosis value is also desired as it translates into a lower 
likelihood of extreme outcomes (a more consistent return). 
Table 23 – Comparison of Skewness (Dotcom Crisis) 
Skewness 
S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P GSCI Equal-
Weighted Index 
S&P 500 Index JPM Bond Index 
Pre-crisis 
01/31/1997 – 03/31/2000 
0.0063 0.2247 -0.2767 -0.1401 
Crisis 
03/31/2000 – 01/31/2003 
-0.4469 -0.2994 0.2767 -0.3980 
Post-Crisis 
01/31/2003 – 06/29/2007 
0.1080 -0.0646 -0.0034 -0.1023 
 
Prior to the Dotcom crisis, we find that both GSCI Indices are positively skewed while the S&P 
500 is negatively skewed. During the Dotcom crisis however, these indices and the S&P 500 all reversed 
their skewness. Going back to the analysis of returns and risk, we found that during this period, returns of 
the GSCI Indices were positive while the S&P 500 was negative. This can be interpreted as, during the 
crisis period, returns of the GSCI Indices were positive on the whole, but at times saw large negative 
returns. The reverse can be said for the S&P 500. 
Table 24 – Comparison of Kurtosis (Dotcom Crisis) 
Kurtosis 
S&P GSCI Total 
Return Index 
S&P GSCI Equal-
Weighted Index 
S&P 500 Index JPM Bond Index 
Pre-crisis 
01/31/1997 – 03/31/2000 
1.6212 1.0408 3.2424 1.0669 
Crisis 
03/31/2000 – 01/31/2003 
2.0766 0.9320 1.1840 0.9388 
Post-Crisis 
01/31/2003 – 06/29/2007 
0.4244 0.4402 1.6816 1.7990 
 
We found that before and after the Dotcom crisis, the GSCI Indices had lower kurtosis than the 
S&P 500. As mentioned previously, this is a desirable trait for asset classes as it means that returns are 
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less dispersed. It should be noted that the S&P 500’s kurtosis went down significantly during the crisis 
period. However, the S&P 500 returned -18.0% during this period and the low kurtosis translates into the 
fact that most of the return observations were negative and of a similar magnitude. 
 
Mean Variance Efficient Frontiers - Dotcom Crisis (Production-Weighted GSCI) 
Figure 14 – Pre-Dotcom Crisis Period MV Efficient Frontiers 
 
Consistent with the results from the analysis of return and volatility, we find that the efficient 
frontiers with two traditional asset classes (stocks and bonds) are not significantly improved by the 
introduction of the GSCI Index (regardless of it being production-weighted or equal-weighted) during the 
pre-crisis period. As mentioned earlier, this was due to the poor performance of commodities as a result 
of the commodities bear market. 
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Figure 15 – Dotcom Crisis Period MV Efficient Frontiers 
 
In the Dotcom crisis period, the efficient frontiers are significantly improved with risk being 
reduced along most points of the frontier. This is consistent with past studies indicating that commodities 
offer diversification benefits when most desired (during the crisis period for example). 
Figure 16 – Post-Dotcom Crisis Period MV Efficient Frontiers 
 
Lastly, in the post-Dotcom crisis period, we still find the presence of diversification benefits 
associated with commodities. In this situation, not only is risk reduced on the frontier, but an investor can 
also achieve higher expected returns given the equal-weighted GSCI Index. In short, the benefits of 
adding commodities to a traditional portfolio are clearly significant in the context of a Dotcom crisis 
scenario.  
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These results are in sharp contrast to those observed in the Financial Crisis scenario and indicates 
that commodities are indeed a viable asset class under most conditions. However disappointing the asset 
allocation implications are during the Financial Crisis scenario, it is possible that this was a one-time 
phenomenon due to the magnitude of the shock. Although we do not hope for another stock market crisis, 
such an event could clarify whether the diversification benefits of commodities as an asset class still exist. 
In the absence of such an event, we can only base our study on past empirical studies and observations 
and conclude that commodities should be deemed a viable asset class that offers potential diversification 
benefits when properly integrated with a traditional portfolio. 
 
Portfolio Value-at-Risk 
Measuring Value-at-Risk 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a measure of downside risk. The VaR of a portfolio at the 95% 
confidence level, for example, is the smallest amount of loss such that the probability of exceeding that 
amount is not greater than 5%. 
First we constructed a hypothetical, “base” U.S. portfolio using the full extended study period of 
January 31, 1997 to June 30, 2011. We chose a 60%/40% weighting of equities (S&P 500 Index) and 
bonds (JPMorgan Funds – U.S. Aggregate Bond Fund), respectively. The skewness of this base portfolio 
was close to zero, at 0.0324, however the kurtosis of the historical sample of returns of this portfolio was 
7.2369, indicating a non-normal distribution. We thus chose to use historical returns to estimate VaR, 
rather than use parametric or simulation methods. 
U.S. Portfolio 
From our starting point of a balanced portfolio of 60% equities and 40% bonds, we replaced part 
of the equity holdings with the GSCI. The resulting allocation was 50% S&P 500, 40% JPMorgan Funds 
Aggregate Bond Fund, and 10% GSCI. We then repeated this exercise with the GSCI Equal-Weighted 
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Index. The results are below for the extended study period, for the DotCom Crisis study period (from pre- 
to post-, inclusive), and for the Financial Crisis study period (from pre- to post-, inclusive). 
Table 25 – Comparison of VaR (Full Study Period) 
 US 60%/40% US 50%/40%/10% - GSCI 
US 50%/40%/10% - 
GSCI-EQ 
99% VaR -2.16% -1.94% -1.87% 
95% VaR -1.20% -1.03% -1.01% 
 
From the above, we see that the base portfolio can be expected to lose in one day at least 2.16% 
of its value, with probability 1% or less. As we add commodities, however, we see that the daily VaR is 
reduced at both the 99% and 95% confidence levels. This indicates that the introduction of commodities 
into a balanced, traditional portfolio, reduces downside risk. 
We repeated this exercise for the Dotcom Crisis study period, and the Financial Crisis study 
period. The results are similar. 
Table 26 – Comparison of VaR (Dotcom Crisis Study Period) 
 US 60%/40% US 50%/40%/10% - GSCI 
US 50%/40%/10% - 
GSCI-EQ 
99% VaR -1.74% -1.48% -1.49% 
95% VaR -1.10% -0.94% -0.94% 
 
Table 27 – Comparison of VaR (Financial Crisis Study Period) 
 US 60%/40% US 50%/40%/10% - GSCI 
US 50%/40%/10% - 
GSCI-EQ 
99% VaR -3.04% -1.70% -1.65% 
95% VaR -1.57% -0.59% -0.57% 
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We can see that in terms of downside risk, the Financial Crisis (including the pre- and post- time 
periods) was much more severe than the Dotcom Crisis (including both pre- and post- time periods). In 
both eras, the inclusion of commodities significantly reduced Value-at-Risk. The equally-weighted GSCI 
is even more effective at this than the GSCI. 
 
Canadian Portfolio 
For Canadian Investors, we created a 60%/40% equities/bonds “base” portfolio using the 
S&P/TSX Composite and the Government of Canada, 10-year, 3.25% fixed bond index. We then adjusted 
the GSCI indices by the USD-CAD exchange rate.  
Table 28 – Comparison of VaR for a Canadian Investor (Full Study Period) 
 Cdn 60%/40% 
Cdn 50%/40%/10% - 
GSCI 
Cdn 50%/40%/10% - 
GSCI-EQ 
99% VaR -2.10% -2.05% -1.77% 
95% VaR -1.20% -1.15% -1.02% 
 
While the above results are similar to the earlier ones for a U.S. investor, it is interesting to note 
that introducing the GSCI has only a small effect in reducing downside risk for the Canadian portfolio, 
but introducing the equally-weighted GSCI has a significant such effect. This is in contrast to the U.S. 
portfolio, where the introduction of the GSCI provided significant risk-reduction benefits while the 
equally-weighted GSCI enhanced those benefits only modestly. This, again, is due to the fact that the 
TSX Composite and GSCI are both heavily weighted towards energy.  
Table 29 – Comparison of VaR for a Canadian Investor (DotCom Crisis Study Period) 
 Cdn 60%/40% 
Cdn 50%/40%/10% - 
GSCI 
Cdn 50%/40%/10% - 
GSCI-EQ 
99% VaR -1.85% -1.77% -1.49% 
95% VaR -1.12% -1.04% -0.97% 
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Table 30 – Comparison of VaR for a Canadian Investor (Financial Crisis Study Period) 
 Cdn 60%/40% 
Cdn 50%/40%/10% - 
GSCI 
Cdn 50%/40%/10% - 
GSCI-EQ 
99% VaR -1.74% -1.72% -1.40% 
95% VaR -0.63% -0.64% -0.56% 
 
Generally speaking, the Dotcom crisis was more severe with respect to portfolio downside risk to 
a Canadian portfolio than it was for a U.S. portfolio, and the reverse was true for the Financial Crisis 
study period. Nevertheless, for all investors adding commodities appears to reduce Value-at-Risk at both 
the 95% and 99% levels. 
 
Conclusion 
Past studies have shown that commodity values “are driven by economic factors distinct 
from the factors determining [equity, bond and real estate] values,” (Greer, 1997) and as such, 
have natural, diversifying qualities versus traditional asset classes. Furthermore, it has been 
shown (Greer, 1997), (Gorton & Rouwenhorst, 2006), (Erb & Harvey, 2006) that various baskets 
of commodities demonstrate negative correlation with equities, bonds and real estate, especially 
over long-term holding periods (Gorton & Rouwenhorst, 2006), thus offering diversifying 
benefits to a traditional portfolio. Gorton and Rouwenhorst also determined that an equally-
weighted basket of commodities had slightly lower volatility versus stocks, and that the 
distribution of commodity returns with the equally-weighted index had positive skewness 
relative to stock performance. 
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These studies, however, examined asset returns prior to the Financial Crisis of the Late-
2000s, the worst financial crisis the world had seen since the Great Depression. Our analysis 
suggests that, prior to, during and after the Financial Crisis, commodities as an asset class (as 
represented by the GSCI) did not offer significant diversification benefits when added to a 
traditional portfolio of stocks and bonds. While commodities did have a small negative 
correlation with stocks and near-zero correlation with bonds prior to the crisis, and a relatively 
low positive correlation with stocks during the crisis, the correlation with equities increased 
dramatically during the post-crisis period (commodities have become strongly, negatively 
correlated with bonds during that time). A two-sample t-Test demonstrated that the average 
correlation between the GSCI and S&P 500 increased sharply after the onset of the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers. We believe that some combination of higher investor risk-aversion, and the 
rise of ETFs and Indexation has contributed to the newfound, high correlation levels. 
Furthermore, commodities have largely underperformed stocks according to returns, the 
distribution of returns (skewness and kurtosis), risk-adjusted return (Sharpe Ratio) and volatility 
since the crisis period began. The GSCI does have a strong correlation with inflation, however, 
though not with core inflation. Thus, commodities as an asset class, as represented by the 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI), have provided only modest diversification benefits to 
a traditional portfolio throughout the Financial Crisis. 
As noted earlier, the GSCI is highly correlated with the performance of energy 
commodities, especially Crude Oil. Following a price boom before the Financial Crisis, energy 
commodities performed particularly poorly as liquidity dried up leading up to, and sovereign 
debt troubles took hold in Europe following, the crisis. As such, the GSCI, 66.5% of which is 
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comprised of energy commodities, experienced particularly high volatility and low returns 
during lengthy periods throughout the entire study. 
For a Canadian equity investor, an investment in commodities offered more appealing of 
an opportunity in the context of a portfolio, as the GSCI, adjusted for currency, had a far higher 
return than the S&P/TSX Composite (albeit with much higher volatility). The return was greatly 
influenced by the U.S. Dollar, which performed poorly versus the Canadian Dollar during and 
after the crisis. The correlations between the GSCI and S&P/TSX Composite (adjusted) are 
relatively high due to the heavy weighting of the Canadian marketplace to energy and materials 
equities. 
By extending the study period to include the Dotcom Crisis, we determined that 
commodities performed well as an asset class, and offered proper diversification benefits to a 
portfolio. We also examined Value-at-Risk (VaR), and showed that for the extended study period 
as a whole, for the Dotcom Crisis study period and for the Financial Crisis study period, adding 
commodity futures to a balanced, traditional portfolio reduces overall downside risk. This is also 
true for Canadian investors, who from a VaR perspective stand to benefit even more greatly from 
the introduction of the equally-weighted GSCI. 
In summary, whereas prior studies indicated that a basket of commodities could serve as 
a viable asset class in the portfolio context due to favourable risk-return characteristics and 
substantial diversification benefits, we found that from 9/30/2003 to 6/30/2011, the GSCI 
contributed only modestly toward the optimization of a traditional portfolio of assets, in large 
part due to its heavy weighting in energy commodities. An investor in the Canadian equity 
marketplace, however, would have found more reason than an investor in the American equity 
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marketplace to add the GSCI to a portfolio of stocks and bonds. This latter finding was due to 
substantially higher return of the GSCI (Adj.) over the S&P/TSX Composite and the weak 
performance of the U.S. Dollar during the study period. The Financial Crisis appears to be a new 
kind of crisis in terms of how it has impacted the benefits of including commodity futures into a 
portfolio. Commodity futures as an asset class appear to be a suitable addition to a prudently 
diversified portfolio. While some of our analysis strikes a cautionary note for investors with 
respect to incorporating a basket of commodities that is heavily weighted in a particular 
commodity type, such as the GSCI, investors can expect at least some diversification benefits 
and a reduction in downside risk, as measured by VaR. And of course if correlations between the 
GSCI and equities revert to lower levels as in the past, commodities would offer even greater 
benefits to a portfolio. 
It is our recommendation that investment funds consider exposure to a basket of 
commodity futures, as, over the long-term and through crises, they have enhanced the 
performance of traditional portfolios of stocks and bonds. It will be important to identify whether 
the high correlations between the GSCI and equity indices in the post Financial Crisis time 
period represent a new reality, or if they are merely of a temporary pattern. 
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Appendix A – S&P GSCI Commodities List  
 
Industrial Metals Energy Products 
Aluminum Crude Oil 
Copper Brent Crude Oil 
Nickel Heating Oil 
Zinc Gas Oil 
Lead RBOB Gasoline 
 
Natural Gas 
Agricultural Products 
 
Wheat Livestock Products 
Kansas Wheat Lean Hogs 
Corn Live Cattle 
Soybeans Feeder Cattle 
Coffee 
 
Sugar Precious Metals 
Cocoa Gold 
Cotton Silver 
 
  
46 
 
Appendix B – S&P GSCI Contract Months (as of 2007) 
 
1 Crude Oil All 13 Cocoa Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 
2 Brent Brude Oil All 14 Cotton Mar, May, Jul, Dec 
3 Heating Oil All 15 Aluminum All 
4 Gas Oil All 16 Copper All 
5 RBOB Gasoline All 17 Nickel All 
6 Natural Gas All 18 Zinc All 
7 Wheat Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 19 Lead All 
8 Kansas Wheat Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 20 Lean Hogs Feb, Apr, Jun, Jul, Aug, Oct, Dec 
9 Corn Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 21 Live Cattle Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, Oct, Dec 
10 Soybeans Jan, Mar, May, Jul, Nov 22 Feeder Cattle Jan, Mar, Apr, May, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov 
11 Coffee Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 23 Gold Feb, Apr, Jun, Aug, Dec 
12 Sugar Mar, May, Jul, Oct 24 Silver Mar, May, Jul, Sep, Dec 
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Appendix C – MatLab Code for the Analysis of Correlation, 
Skewness, and Kurtosis 
 
clc 
close all 
clear all 
format compact 
  
[Returns,Titles1]=xlsread('C:\Users\DW\Dropbox\Commodities Thesis\Thesis (Data and 
Outline)\MatLab\Data.xlsx'); 
% [INF,Titles2]=xlsread('C:\Users\DW\Dropbox\Commodities Thesis\Thesis (Data and 
Outline)\MatLab\Inflation.xlsx'); 
% [RE,Titles3]=xlsread('C:\Users\DW\Dropbox\Commodities Thesis\Thesis (Data and 
Outline)\MatLab\NCREIF.xlsx'); 
[USTreas,Titles4]=xlsread('C:\Users\DW\Dropbox\Commodities Thesis\Thesis (Data and 
Outline)\MatLab\USTreasChange.xlsx'); 
  
  
%%%%%%%%% STOCK & BOND ANALYSIS %%%%%%%%% 
% 09/24/2003 - 06/29/2007 (PRE-CRISIS) 
GSCIRetB = Returns(1:949,1); 
StockRetB = Returns(1:949,2); 
BondRetB = Returns(1:949,3); 
USGovB = USTreas(1:949,1); 
  
% 06/29/2007 - 03/31/2009 (CRISIS) 
GSCIRetD = Returns(949:1390,1); 
StockRetD = Returns(949:1390,2); 
BondRetD = Returns(949:1390,3); 
USGovD = USTreas(949:1390,1); 
  
% 06/29/2007 - 06/30/2011 (POST-CRISIS) 
GSCIRetC = Returns(1390:end,1); 
StockRetC = Returns(1390:end,2); 
BondRetC = Returns(1390:end,3); 
USGovC = USTreas(1390:end,1); 
  
% 09/24/2003 - 06/30/2011 (ALL DATA) 
GSCIRet = Returns(1:end,1); 
StockRet = Returns(1:end,2); 
BondRet = Returns(1:end,3); 
USGov = USTreas(1:end,1); 
  
disp('----------') 
disp('09/24/2003 - 06/29/2007 (PRE-CRISIS)') 
GSCI_skewB = skewness(GSCIRetB) 
Stock_skewB = skewness(StockRetB) 
Bond_skewB = skewness(BondRetB) 
GSIC_kurtB = kurtosis(GSCIRetB) 
Stock_kurtB = kurtosis(StockRetB) 
Bond_kurtB = kurtosis(BondRetB) 
Rho_GSCI_StockB = corr(GSCIRetB, StockRetB) 
Rho_GSCI_BondB = corr(GSCIRetB, BondRetB) 
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Rho_Stock_BondB = corr(StockRetB, BondRetB) 
Rho_GSCI_USGovB = corr(GSCIRetB, USGovB) 
  
disp('----------') 
disp('06/29/2007 - 03/31/2009 (CRISIS)') 
GSCI_skewD = skewness(GSCIRetD) 
Stock_skewD = skewness(StockRetD) 
Bond_skewD = skewness(BondRetD) 
GSIC_kurtD = kurtosis(GSCIRetD) 
Stock_kurtD = kurtosis(StockRetD) 
Bond_kurtD = kurtosis(BondRetD) 
Rho_GSCI_StockD = corr(GSCIRetD, StockRetD) 
Rho_GSCI_BondD = corr(GSCIRetD, BondRetD) 
Rho_Stock_BondD = corr(StockRetD, BondRetD) 
Rho_GSCI_USGovD = corr(GSCIRetD, USGovD) 
  
disp('----------') 
disp('03/31/2009 - 06/30/2011 (POST-CRISIS)') 
GSCI_skewC = skewness(GSCIRetC) 
Stock_skewC = skewness(StockRetC) 
Bond_skewC = skewness(BondRetC) 
GSIC_kurtC = kurtosis(GSCIRetC) 
Stock_kurtC = kurtosis(StockRetC) 
Bond_kurtC = kurtosis(BondRetC) 
Rho_GSCI_StockC = corr(GSCIRetC, StockRetC) 
Rho_GSCI_BondC = corr(GSCIRetC, BondRetC) 
Rho_Stock_BondC = corr(StockRetC, BondRetC) 
Rho_GSCI_USGovC = corr(GSCIRetC, USGovC) 
  
disp('----------') 
disp('09/24/2003 - 06/30/2011 (ALL DATA)') 
GSCI_skew = skewness(GSCIRet) 
Stock_skew = skewness(StockRet) 
Bond_skew = skewness(BondRet) 
GSIC_kurt = kurtosis(GSCIRet) 
Stock_kurt = kurtosis(StockRet) 
Bond_kurt = kurtosis(BondRet) 
Rho_GSCI_Stock = corr(GSCIRet, StockRet) 
Rho_GSCI_Bond = corr(GSCIRet, BondRet) 
Rho_Stock_Bond = corr(StockRet, BondRet) 
Rho_GSCI_USGov = corr(GSCIRet, USGov) 
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Appendix D – MatLab Output for the Analysis Code 
 
---------- 
09/24/2003 - 06/29/2007 (PRE-CRISIS) 
GSCI_skewB = 
    0.1581 
Stock_skewB = 
   -0.1735 
Bond_skewB = 
   -0.0787 
GSIC_kurtB = 
    3.3962 
Stock_kurtB = 
    3.9658 
Bond_kurtB = 
    3.6931 
Rho_GSCI_StockB = 
   -0.0185 
Rho_GSCI_BondB = 
    0.0469 
Rho_Stock_BondB = 
   -0.0704 
Rho_GSCI_USGovB = 
    0.0409 
---------- 
06/29/2007 - 03/31/2009 (CRISIS) 
GSCI_skewD = 
   -0.1476 
Stock_skewD = 
    0.1845 
Bond_skewD = 
   -2.2530 
GSIC_kurtD = 
    4.3725 
Stock_kurtD = 
    7.2861 
Bond_kurtD = 
   37.7039 
Rho_GSCI_StockD = 
    0.3216 
Rho_GSCI_BondD = 
    0.0982 
Rho_Stock_BondD = 
   -0.0474 
Rho_GSCI_USGovD = 
   -0.2717 
---------- 
03/31/2009 - 06/30/2011 (POST-CRISIS) 
GSCI_skewC = 
   -0.2104 
Stock_skewC = 
   -0.1910 
Bond_skewC = 
   -0.4890 
GSIC_kurtC = 
    4.0313 
Stock_kurtC = 
    4.5479 
Bond_kurtC = 
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    5.1299 
Rho_GSCI_StockC = 
    0.5835 
Rho_GSCI_BondC = 
   -0.2316 
Rho_Stock_BondC = 
   -0.3071 
Rho_GSCI_USGovC = 
   -0.3108 
---------- 
09/24/2003 - 06/30/2011 (ALL DATA) 
GSCI_skew = 
   -0.1271 
Stock_skew = 
   -0.0027 
Bond_skew = 
   -2.4449 
GSIC_kurt = 
    4.9832 
Stock_kurt = 
   14.9696 
Bond_kurt = 
   68.1904 
Rho_GSCI_Stock = 
    0.2943 
Rho_GSCI_Bond = 
    0.0179 
Rho_Stock_Bond = 
   -0.0989 
Rho_GSCI_USGov = 
   -0.2003 
---------- 
NCREIF PRE-CRISIS: JUN 30 2003 - JUN 30 2007 
Rho_GSCI_NCREIFA = 
    0.7071 
NCREIF DURING-CRISIS: JUN 30 2007 - MAR 31 2009 
Rho_GSCI_NCREIFC = 
    0.6298 
NCREIF POST-CRISIS: MAR 31 2009 - JUN 30 2011 
Rho_GSCI_NCREIFB = 
    0.6684 
NCREIF FULL PERIOD: JUN 30 2003 - JUN 30 2011 
Rho_GSCI_NCREIF = 
    0.3453 
---------- 
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Appendix E – MatLab Code for Efficient Frontiers 
clc 
clear all 
close all 
format compact 
  
%%%%% FULL PERIOD %%%%% 
% 2 Assets - Stocks and Bonds 
Ret1 = [0.03519804 0.005917969] 
VCV1 = [0.044501127 -0.001244403; -0.001244403 0.003558143] 
NumPorts = 100; 
Bounds1 = [0 0; 1 1]; 
  
% 3 Assets - GSCI, Stocks, and Bonds 
Ret2 = [0.032399159 0.03519804 0.005917969] 
VCV2 = [0.072808555 0.016750254 0.000287646; 0.016750254 0.044501127 -0.001244403; 0.000287646 -
0.001244403 0.003558143] 
Bounds2 = [0 0 0; 1 1 1]; 
  
[PortRisk1, PortRet1, PortWts1] = frontcon(Ret1, VCV1, NumPorts, [], Bounds1); 
[PortRisk2, PortRet2, PortWts2] = frontcon(Ret2, VCV2, NumPorts, [], Bounds2); 
  
hold on 
figure(1); 
plot(PortRisk1, PortRet1, PortRisk2, PortRet2) 
title('MV Frontier: Full Period (09/24/2003 - 06/30/2011)','fontweight','b') 
xlabel('Risk (Standard Deviation)') 
ylabel('Expected Return') 
legend('2 Assets: Stocks, Bonds','3 Assets: GSCI, Stocks, Bonds') 
legend('Location','SouthEast') 
hold off 
  
%%%%% PRE-CRISIS PERIOD %%%%% 
% 2 Assets - Stocks and Bonds 
Ret1A = [0.111578962 -0.009319228] 
VCV1A = [0.011393161 -0.000292452; -0.000292452 0.001514398] 
  
% 3 Assets - GSCI, Stocks, and Bonds 
Ret2A = [0.116414747 0.111578962 -0.009319228] 
VCV2A = [0.053452704 -0.000457406 0.000422114; -0.000457406 0.011393161 -0.000292452; 0.000422114 -
0.000292452 0.001514398] 
  
[PortRisk1A, PortRet1A, PortWts1A] = frontcon(Ret1A, VCV1A, NumPorts, [], Bounds1); 
[PortRisk2A, PortRet2A, PortWts2A] = frontcon(Ret2A, VCV2A, NumPorts, [], Bounds2); 
  
hold on 
figure(2); 
plot(PortRisk1A, PortRet1A, PortRisk2A, PortRet2A) 
title('MV Frontier: Pre-Crisis Period (09/24/2003 - 06/29/2007)','fontweight','b') 
xlabel('Risk (Standard Deviation)') 
ylabel('Expected Return') 
legend('2 Assets: Stocks, Bonds','3 Assets: GSCI, Stocks, Bonds') 
legend('Location','SouthEast') 
hold off 
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%%%%% CRISIS PERIOD %%%%% 
% 2 Assets - Stocks and Bonds 
Ret1B = [-0.303149347 0.017906166] 
VCV1B = [0.131011289 -0.001720922; -0.001720922 0.010044268] 
  
% 3 Assets - GSCI, Stocks, and Bonds 
Ret2B = [-0.256181424 -0.303149347 0.017906166] 
VCV2B = [0.13412341 0.042633766 0.003604121; 0.042633766 0.131011289 -0.001720922; 0.003604121 -
0.001720922 0.010044268] 
  
[PortRisk1B, PortRet1B, PortWts1B] = frontcon(Ret1B, VCV1B, NumPorts, [], Bounds1); 
[PortRisk2B, PortRet2B, PortWts2B] = frontcon(Ret2B, VCV2B, NumPorts, [], Bounds2); 
  
hold on 
figure(3); 
plot(PortRisk1B, PortRet1B, PortRisk2B, PortRet2B) 
title('MV Frontier: Crisis Period (06/29/2007 - 03/31/2009)','fontweight','b') 
legend('2 Assets: Stocks, Bonds','3 Assets: GSCI, Stocks, Bonds') 
legend('Location','SouthEast') 
xlabel('Risk (Standard Deviation)') 
ylabel('Expected Return') 
hold off 
  
%%%%% POST-CRISIS PERIOD %%%%% 
% 2 Assets - Stocks and Bonds 
Ret1C = [0.250045451 0.022380594] 
VCV1C = [0.032124357 -0.002425964; -0.002425964 0.001942924] 
  
% 3 Assets - GSCI, Stocks, and Bonds 
Ret2C = [0.168774572 0.250045451 0.022380594] 
VCV2C = [0.057361505 0.025049609 -0.002444537; 0.025049609 0.032124357 -0.002425964; -0.002444537 -
0.002425964 0.001942924] 
  
[PortRisk1C, PortRet1C, PortWts1C] = frontcon(Ret1C, VCV1C, NumPorts, [], Bounds1); 
[PortRisk2C, PortRet2C, PortWts2C] = frontcon(Ret2C, VCV2C, NumPorts, [], Bounds2); 
  
hold on 
figure(4); 
plot(PortRisk1C, PortRet1C, PortRisk2C, PortRet2C) 
title('MV Frontier: Post-Crisis Period (03/31/2009 - 06/30/2011)','fontweight','b') 
xlabel('Risk (Standard Deviation)') 
ylabel('Expected Return') 
legend('2 Assets: Stocks, Bonds','3 Assets: GSCI, Stocks, Bonds') 
legend('Location','SouthEast') 
hold off 
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